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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Granted Brown's Suppression Motion On The
Erroneous Legal Theory That Briefly Requesting Consent To Search A Legally Detained
Vehicle Constitutes An Unlawful Extension Of A Traffic Stop
A.

Introduction
Late in the evening, after observing him suspiciously idle in an empty parking lot

long after the local stores had closed, Officer Cwik pulled over Brown for driving a
vehicle with a piece of opaque plastic taped across the back window obstructing his
view. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.6, L.20.) Officer Cwik told Brown about the violation
and took his license, registration, and insurance, which he used to check for warrants
and the status of Brown's license through dispatch.

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-24.)

After running the records check, Officer Cwik returned and, before returning Brown's
license, registration, and proof of insurance, spent "about 30 seconds" discussing with
Brown his driving pattern and requesting consent to search his vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr.,
p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.5; p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.4; p.9, Ls.8-21; see also 4/30/2012 Tr., p.11,
Ls.11-18; p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.18.) Brown granted consent and officers proceeded to
search his vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.17-21.)
Officers found large quantities of marijuana and other items indicative of drug
delivery in Brown's vehicle. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.17, L.19) Brown moved the
district court for an order suppressing the evidence. (R., pp.38-39.) The district court
found that there was "no reason to believe that Mr. Brown's consent was coerced or
threatened out of him." (5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-5.) However, because Officer Cwik
requested consent to search before returning Brown's license, registration, and proof of
insurance, the district court found that Brown's detention was extended and that the
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extension was unlawful.

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, L.6 - p.11, L.22.) Application of the

correct legal standards, however, shows that the district court erred in its legal
determination that Officer Cwik unlawfully extended Brown's detention.

8.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review on a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302,
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

An Officer Does Not Offend The Fourth Amendment By Momentarily Extending A
Traffic Stop To Request Consent To Search A Vehicle
After a hearing on Brown's suppression motion, the district court made the legal

conclusion that detaining Brown was reasonable. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.)
The district court found that, after running Brown's license and registration, the officer
spoke with Brown for "about 30 seconds" during which time the officer requested and
received consent to search Brown's vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.8, L. 23-p.9, L.16.) The
district court further found that Officer Cwik extended the traffic stop "for no articulable
reason other than for the officer to ask for consent to search the vehicle." (5/24/2012
Tr., p.10, Ls.7-18.) The district court held that extending the traffic stop for "about 30
seconds" to request consent to search Brown's vehicle was unlawful and so granted
Brown's suppression motion. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.1.)
The district court's ruling directly contradicts the Court of Appeals' opinion in
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 11 P.3d 44 (Ct. App. 2000), which held that an officer
2

conducting a legal traffic stop may lawfully request consent to search the vehicle while
the driver is still detained, when such a request only momentarily extends the traffic
stop.

~

at 852-53, 11 P.3d at 48-49. It is well settled that, while a significant delay is

unreasonable, officers maintain limited discretion to conduct brief inquiries unrelated to
the purpose of a traffic stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306
(Ct. App. 2000).

Momentarily requesting consent to search a vehicle during a

conversation which lasts only "about 30 seconds" is therefore lawful and the district
court erred in granting Brown's suppression motion on that basis.
On appeal, Brown attempts to distinguish Silva. (Respondent's brief, pp.10-12.)
His attempts are unavailing.

In Silva, an officer observed Silva committing a traffic

infraction, in that case speeding, and enforced a traffic stop. Silva, 134 Idaho at 851, 11
P.3d at 47.

After asking whether Silva had any drugs or weapons in his truck, the

officer took Silva's license, registration, and proof of insurance, which he used to
complete a records check while he wrote out a citation.

~

The officer then returned

and spent about fifteen seconds explaining the citation to Silva, after which, while still
holding the citation in his hand, he asked for consent to search Silva's vehicle.

1st

Similarly in this case, Officer Cwik pulled over Brown after observing Brown commit a
traffic infraction. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-21; p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) Officer Cwik took
Brown's information to check Brown's driving status. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8,
L.3.) Officer Cwik then returned and, without returning Brown's documents, conversed
with him for "about 30 seconds," during which time he requested permission to search
Brown's vehicle and Brown consented. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-21.)

3

The only distinguishing feature between this case and Silva is that in Silva the
Court correctly held that momentarily extending a traffic stop to request consent to
search a vehicle is lawful, whereas the district court in this case held that it was not. On
the basis of that erroneous legal conclusion, the district court's order suppressing the
evidence should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings.
Brown also appears to challenge the district court's factual finding that Officer
Cwik spoke to Brown for "about 30 seconds," during which time he requested and
obtained consent to search Brown's vehicle, before Brown exited his vehicle.
(Respondent's brief, pp.10-12, nn.4-5.) In evaluating rulings on suppression motions,
the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). "Findings
of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent
evidence." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127-28, 233 P.3d 52, 58-59 (2010). The
district court found that Officer Cwik and Brown had a conversation that lasted "about 30
seconds" before Brown exited the vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-12.) After Brown
granted consent and exited the vehicle, officers began searching the vehicle.
(5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-21.) These factual findings are supported by both Officer
Cwik's testimony and Defense Exhibit A.
Regardless, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether a momentary extension of
a traffic stop for the purpose of requesting and obtaining consent to search a vehicle is
lawful. The district court erroneously concluded that it was not, and on that basis the
district court should be reversed and this case remanded.

4

As an alternative basis for reversing the district court's erroneous order, the state
argued in its Appellant's brief that, if the traffic stop was extended, any extension was
supported by reasonable suspicion.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.)

In his Respondent's

brief, Brown asserts that Officer Cwik lacked reasonable suspicion to justify expanding
the scope of his investigation to drug crimes, arguing that an anonymous tip received by
police was not sufficient to justify that investigation.

(Respondent's brief, pp.12-14.)

The state has already conceded that the anonymous tip, standing alone, would not be
enough to justify the stop. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) In this case, however, the
anonymous tip was not standing alone.
In addition to the anonymous tip, Officer Cwik had his own personal observations
of Brown's suspicious conduct. Brown was suspiciously idling in a nearly abandoned
parking lot in front of a closed Hastings bookstore in the late evening in an area where
no businesses were open. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-18; p.12, Ls.7-12; 5/24/2012 Tr.,
p.5, Ls.8-21.) Brown's van matched the tipster's description of the vehicle where drugs
were being sold. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, L.19- p.12, L.6.) Brown exited the parking lot,
circling the block in an "eccentric or erratic" manner.

(4/30/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10;

5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.12.) After detaining him for the traffic violation, Officer
Cwik asked Brown about his driving pattern, but Brown, according to the district court,
failed to offer "a very satisfying explanation" for his circuitous route.

(4/30/2012 Tr.,

p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.21; 5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, L.25- p.7, L.5.)
Whether an officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, not any one circumstance
standing by itself. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App.
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2004). Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002). Under the totality of the circumstances of
this case, where police had received an anonymous tip about drugs being sold out of a
blue minivan in the neighborhood, where Brown was suspiciously idling in an
abandoned parking lot long after the stores had closed in a blue minivan which matched
the tipster's description, where police observed Brown driving in an irregular pattern
around the block, and where Brown could not give a satisfactory answer for his traffic
pattern, Officer Cwik had reasonable suspicion to further investigate a possible crime by
taking "about 30 seconds" to request consent to search Brown's vehicle.
Finally, Brown asserts that his detention itself was unlawful, apparently because
no one referenced Idaho Code § 49-943 and, after officers found large quantities of
marijuana in his minivan, Brown was not ultimately cited for the traffic violation.
(Respondent's brief, pp.14-15.) Brown cites no authority for the proposition that officers
are required to cite the specific code section violated or issue a citation for every traffic
violation they observe. Rather, whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a
suspect is an objective test not dependant on the subjective beliefs of an individual
officer. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v.
State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592,593 (1998)).
Brown was operating a vehicle which had a piece of opaque plastic taped across
the back window, necessarily obscuring Brown's view behind him. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5,
Ls.14-21; p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) That is an objective violation of Idaho Code§ 49-943.
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Therefore, as correctly concluded by the district court, as a matter of law, Officer Cwik
objectively had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown for his traffic violation.
In this case, the district court held that momentarily extending a traffic stop to
request and obtain consent to search a vehicle was unlawful. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, L.4
- p.11, L.22.) As a matter of law, the district court's ruling was erroneous. The court's
order suppressing evidence found during the consent-based search of Brown's vehicle
should therefore be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
and remand for further proceedings.

DATED this 13th day of August, 2013.

LJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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